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We develop a New Keynesian model that incorporates rigidities in
the ability of households and ﬁrms to adjust their utility-eﬃcient /
proﬁt-eﬃcient resource allocation in response to shocks. These rigidi-
ties reﬂect the fact that households and ﬁrms enter into commitments
for several periods of time regarding the allocation of resources lim-
iting their ability to ﬂexibly respond to unforeseen shocks. We show
that these rigidities can adversely impact the productivity of ﬁrms and
households’ utility and result in the appearance of higher statistical
moments in the demand and supply curves which are not exogenously
constant but system-endogenous. As a result, we will derive the ap-
pearance of an inﬂation bias which exists even in the case of an eﬃcient
natural output and which cannot be removed by a rule-based mone-
tary policy. Further, we show that monetary policy faces an additional
trade-oﬀ in managing the friction losses due to inﬂation uncertainty
and output uncertainty. (JEL D81, E10, E52).
I Introduction
In this paper we elaborate the impact of rigidities in the ability of economic
subjects to adjust their resource allocation to unforeseen income and inﬂa-
tion shocks on households and ﬁrms as well as welfare. Further we derive the
implications of these rigidities for the conduct of monetary policy.
To be precise, we argue that in addition to price and wage rigidities widely
taken into account in research, economic subjects also face rigidities regard-
ing their consumption and resource allocation, i.e. households commit part
1of their income for consumption over several periods of time. Likewise, ﬁrms
commit resources for several periods in advance and hence are limited in their
ability to adjust their resources to shocks. We show that uncertainty regard-
ing future income and inﬂation creates friction losses when consumption on
the demand side and resources on the supply side are not fully ﬂexible, but
can only be changed within a certain time frame due to the fact that both
households and ﬁrms commit resources for several time periods.
As a consequence, we will show that the model equations for demand and sup-
ply will not only incorporate expectations but also higher statistical moments
of endogenous variables representing the afore-mentioned friction losses caused
by rigidities in the form of the limited ability of economic subjects to adjust
their resource plans to shocks. Further, we will show that these statistical
moments show the property that we call endogenous uncertainty, i.e. they
are not exogenously prescribed but deﬁned within the economic system. In
particular, they depend on the conduct of monetary policy.
The key results that we derive in our model are
• The natural interest rate and the natural output level are dependent
on the second order statistical moments representing friction losses and
are hence inﬂuenced by the conduct of monetary policy through the
determination of the underlying probability distribution of endogenous
variables.
• On the demand side we see that frictions reduce the impact of future
income expectations on present demand, since households are aware of
the risk of future friction losses and hence take them into account by
saving more as a buﬀer against potential future losses.
• On the supply side frictions caused by ﬁrms’ inﬂexibility to adjust to
shocks reduce the average productivity and hence the natural output
level, because ﬁrms are on average ineﬃciently invested in labor. These
friction losses in production are passed on to consumers in the form
of higher markups. Further we see that ﬁrms facing uncertain future
inﬂation levels have a tendency to ”over-price” their products, resulting
in an additional inﬂation bias which exists even in the case where the
natural output is eﬃcient and which cannot be removed by a rule-based
monetary policy.
2• Monetary policy faces a new trade-oﬀ in managing friction losses due
to output variability and inﬂation variability. Thus, the choice of a
monetary policy regime does not only inﬂuence demand and supply di-
rectly by the corresponding policy function, but also indirectly through
the statistical moments of the probability distribution of endogenous
variables that result from the choice of the respective policy.
The global impact of these frictions on the supply side reducing productivity
and on the demand side absorbing part of a households’ purchasing power
can be summarized in the following stylized equations:
Gross household income = Output - frictions in production (1)
Disposable household income = Gross household income
− frictions in consumption (2)
It is important to mention that the analysis of both aspects – uncertainty
and rigidities – within the New Keynesian model framework has been an
important focus of recent research. In particular the inclusion of costs of
re-allocation is also considered by other authors, e.g. Smets and Wouters
(2003) and (2007) and Christiano et al. (2005) develop a model where ad-
justment to the utilization of the capital stock of households incurs costs of
re-allocation and where the empirically observed persistence of consumption
is introduced into the model framework by external habit formation. Our
description of costs of re-allocation is diﬀerent in two aspects: First of all,
the persistence of consumption is not introduced by external habit formation
but is explained by the costs economic subjects face when they have to alter
long-term consumption plans and hence provides an alternative explanation
for households’ consumption persistence. Secondly, we include costs of re-
allocation on the supply side as well, where they will appear in the form of
overhead costs due to labor surplus when demand is below expectations or
additional short-term hiring costs whenever demand for goods exceeds pre-
vious expectations. Hiring costs have been integrated into a New Keynesian
model framework before, in particular by Blanchard and Gali 2008, who as-
sumed that period t labor demand Nt is given by a ﬁxed factor of previous
employment (1−δ)Nt−1 plus new hires causing hiring costs depending on the
tightness of the job market. Our model diﬀers in the sense that the driver
of hiring costs are surprise ﬂuctuations in the demand for a ﬁrm’s good and
the limited ability of ﬁrms to adjust their labor force in a timely manner,
3whereas in the model of Blanchard and Gali (2008) the costs are determined
by the absolute amount of hiring and the tightness of the job market.
As regards the role of uncertainty within New Keynesian models, an im-
portant focus of research is the so-called robust control theory (cf Hansen
and Sargent, 2001; Dennis, 2007 and Svensson and Williams, 2007), which
analyzes a monetary authority under model uncertainty, i.e. one assumes
that the ”real” model for the economy which provides the observer with eco-
nomic data diﬀers from the model used by central banks. The intention of
the robust control theory is to derive monetary decision rules, that work in
the set of models close to the known model.
Another important concept is the well-known certainty equivalence theo-
rem, which basically states that the behavior of the economic system and
the way monetary policy should be conducted is determined by expectations
of endogenous variables. Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2003) have proved that
in a very general equilibrium model setup, higher order approximations lead
to model equations containing higher statistical moments of shock variables,
but only as constant terms, i.e. the reaction coeﬃcients of monetary policy
remain unimpacted. This can be interpreted as a further justiﬁcation of the
certainty equivalence theorem. A similar result is found by other authors,
e.g. the recognition of signal extraction in the model setup as outlined in
Swanson (2000) leads to a modiﬁcation of the certainty equivalence result
expressed as terms which contain constant higher statistical moments.
It is important to mention that in the context of the robust control theory
and the certainty equivalence theorem probability distributions of shock vari-
ables are exogenously constant which implies constant statistical moments of
the distribution functions, in contrast to system-endogenously deﬁned prob-
ability distributions that we will discover in this paper.
Compared with the above-mentioned areas of research, our paper elaborates
a diﬀerent aspect of uncertainty: We analyze the role of uncertainty in the
decision-making process of households and ﬁrms facing rigidities in their re-
source allocation due to commitment, whereas the above-mentioned robust
control theory focuses on the role of uncertainty from the policy makers’ point
of view. In brief, our model approach uses the following line or argument:
4• Households and ﬁrms face rigidities regarding their allocation of re-
sources over time, i.e. part of their resources is pre-committed for sev-
eral periods and hence cannot be adjusted ﬂexibly when shocks occur
or the adjustment after shocks implies frictions in the form of addi-
tional costs (e.g. contractual penalty fees) to re-arrange the committed
resource plans.
• These rigidities appear in the optimization problem of households and
ﬁrms and will result in second (and possibly higher) order statistical
moments in the model equations for demand and supply, representing
friction losses due to ineﬃcient resource allocation.
• These higher statistical moments are not exogenously constant but are
system endogenous. In particular, they depend on the type of shocks to
the system and the conduct of monetary policy, i.e. the monetary au-
thority can actively inﬂuence the underlying probability distributions
and hence the corresponding statistical moments and thereby actively
manage the trade-oﬀ between friction losses caused by output variabil-
ity and inﬂation variability.
The derivation of the log-linearized model equations for demand and supply
is performed in two steps:
1. At ﬁrst we take the expectation of the equations for demand and supply
over those endogenous variables that cause friction losses for economic
subjects. This reﬂects the fact that economic subjects are aware of
these potential losses and take them into account in their future re-
source planning in the present period.
2. Afterwards, we perform a standard log-linearization of the system.
Performing step one before step two ensures that friction losses appear in the
form of second order moments in the model.
For both demand and supply we will show that rigidities in the ﬂexibility
of adjusting resources after shocks can be introduced into the model in two
diﬀerent ways: Firstly, by directly imposing a rule of inﬂexibility regard-
ing shocks for several periods of time. Secondly, by imposing costs of re-
allocation, i.e. economic subjects adjusting a pre-committed resource path
5face additional costs, which for instance occur when contractual commit-
ments have to be adjusted. We will show that the second concept is more
general and hence will be used to derive our model equations.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In section two we integrate the
above-mentioned inﬂexibility of households for adjusting their resource path
after shocks into their optimizing behavior and derive the corresponding New
Keynesian IS curve. Section three develops a model for proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms facing rigidities in their ability to adjust their labor force in response
to demand shocks for their goods in the short-term to derive an inﬂation ad-
justment curve (IA curve). Section four analyzes the role of monetary policy
within a log-linearized model framework before the conclusion in section ﬁve.
II Decision making of households
We want to derive a model that shows the impact of rigidities in the ability
of households to optimally adjust their resources when shocks occur. To be
precise, one can distinguish between two types of goods:
1. Ct is a good for which a household has (contractually) pre-committed a
certain consumption path over several periods of time and hence faces
rigidities when trying to adjust this consumption path after the occur-
rence of unforeseen shocks. For instance, mortgages, apartment rents,
leasing contracts etc. typically imply a commitment of a household’s
consumption for several periods.
2. Dt denotes a fully ﬂexible good, i.e. households can increase or reduce
their consumption in this good in response to sudden income changes.
For instance, food, clothes etc. would be deemed to be ﬂexible goods.
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we will neglect fully
ﬂexible goods Dt in the description of households, because this type of good
has become the standard description of consumption within the family of
New Keynesian models and it is straightforward to see that adding a ﬂexible
good Dt to the model setup below will not change the results we develop in
the following.
The period-t utility function of households entailing consumption Ct, real





























The household income consists of the real wage earned (Wt/Pt)Nt based on




Nt + Πt (4)
Further, households can hold bonds Bt and hence the budget constraint reads:




Equation (5) basically states that the expected income surplus Vt − Ct not
used for consumption in period t can be used to either increase expected
real money balances or bond holdings, where (1+πt) denotes the amount of
money an economic subject has to save at the beginning of period t to own
one real money unit at the beginning of period t + 1, whereas 1
1+rt denotes
the price of a bond at time t that pays oﬀ one real money unit at time t+1.
A Frictions in consumption
To assess the impact of shocks on households, we make the following assump-
tion: In period T the household calculates its optimal allocation including
consumption Ct|T for t ≥ T +1, based on the expected future income Vt|T and
inﬂation levels πt|T. We assume that the household enters into a commitment
(e.g. by contractual arrangements) for the consumption path Ct|T for several
periods of time. However, in the following period T +1 we assume a shock to
the household’s budget (5) occurs, which can either be caused by an income
7shock ǫV
T+1 or an inﬂation shock ǫπ
T+1 to the previously expected income and
inﬂation levels, i.e. actual income and actual inﬂation read:
VT+1 = VT+1|T + ǫ
V
T (6)
πT+1 = πT+1|T + ǫ
π
T (7)








which we will include into the budget (5) when solving the household’s utility
optimization problem.
Consequently, in period T + 1 the household re-optimizes its expected fu-




T+1)) of consumption, money holding
and labor supply in response to the shock ǫB
T+1 it has perceived in period T+1.
Furthermore, we argue that there are two diﬀerent ways of modeling the
afore-mentioned inﬂexibility of households to adjust their consumption plans
to a budget shock ǫB
T+1:
Cost of reallocation:
When a household wants to change its future consumption plan in a period
T +1 due to a shock ǫB
T+1 from the previously contractually committed values
Ct|T to the the adjusted values Ct(ǫB
T+1) then additional costs are incurred




with Ct(0) = Ct|T denoting the pre-committed value and Ct(ǫB
T+1) the opti-
mally adjusted value. These costs occur for example if a household wants
to change a contractually pre-committed consumption scheme, e.g. when
leasing or mortgage contracts are canceled before maturity, or if a household
has to change location due to lower than expected income or job searching
costs after an adverse income shock (e.g. due to unemployment).
We require the cost function to be increasing in the diﬀerence between the
optimally adjusted value Ct(ǫB
T+1) and the un-shocked value Ct(0):




T+1) − Ct(0)] (9)











Nt(ǫ) + Πt + δt|T+1ǫ





      







1, i = j
0, i  = j
(11)
The actual budget in (10) is composed of the budget (5) plus the budget
shock (8) and the cost of reallocation. To promote a model, we use a cost






Function (12) deﬁnes the cost of adjusting consumption after a budget shock
as a percentage of the value of the committed consumption Ct(0), where
the percentage term increases monotonically in the deviation of the adjusted
consumption Ct(ǫB
T+1) from committed consumption Ct(0) from zero to the
saturation level of 1. The factor δ > 0 indicates the sensitivity of adjustment
costs to the afore-mentioned deviations. Further, (12) fulﬁlls condition (9):
f
′
t(Ct(ǫ)) = −2(Ct(ǫ) − Ct(0))δe
−δ(Ct(ǫ)−Ct(0))2
(13)
The optimality conditions derived from (10) with respect to consumption
and money holdings are
uM(Mt+1(ǫ
B



















with uC(Ct) = C
−α
t and uM(Mt) = τM
−β
t . Further, the optimality condition
for the labor market reads (with f′
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t(1 + f













CC := uCC(Ct) = −αC
−α−1
t and ut
MM := uMM(Mt) = −βM
−β−1
t .










cc − (1 + πt)






cc − 1 − f
′(Ct)
 








t = 0 (20)




with respect to the budget shock ǫB
T+1 iteratively starting from period T +1
for all future periods, indicating the change of its resource allocation in re-
sponse to a period-T + 1 budget shock.
Inﬂexible consumption:
The consumption plan Ct|T as committed in period T cannot be changed at
all for a number of periods t = T + 1..T + K, because the household is con-
tractually bound which implies indirect wealth losses because the household
cannot select a utility-eﬃcient resource plan (Ct,Mt,Nt) for these periods.
Thus consumption Ct is independent of ǫB








u(Ct(1(t>T+K)ǫ),Mt(ǫ),Nt(ǫ)) + λt[Vt + δtT+1ǫ




      




10The factor 1(t>T+K) equals one if t > T + K and zero otherwise and ensures
that for the ﬁrst K periods consumption cannot be adjusted to the shock
ǫB
T+1. In the following we will show that the inﬂexibility in consumption can












To replicate the optimality conditions of the Lagrange function (10) the cost
function has to be tailored such that the derivative of (10) with respect to
Ct equals the derivative of the Lagrange function (21) with respect to Ct, i.e.





































Taking into account the properties of the utility function uC > 0, uCC < 0
the cost function shows the desired properties (9). Further, it is interesting
to note that ft(Ct) = 0 if t > T + K, which means that the cost-function ft
appears in the same periods as the inﬂexibility.
Since the concept of re-allocation costs is more general, we will use it in
the following.
B Household demand
As a next step, we apply the optimality condition (15) to the two periods
T and T + 1 to construct the IS curve reﬂecting the impact of adjustment
costs on the demand side. The conditions (17) till (19) we derived from the
11Lagrange-function (10) show the change of the optimal path of consump-
tion, money and bond holdings as a function of a realized budget shock ǫB
T+1.
However, when economic subjects plan future periods they will take the ex-
pectation over all possible outcomes of future shock variables, in contrast
to the present period T where endogenous variables are known without un-
certainty. To be precise, in period T in which expectations are formed all
endogenous variables are known without uncertainty and hence the marginal
period utility equals uC(CT), whereas in period T +1 the marginal expected
utility is calculated as the expected value over the shock ǫB
T+1, taking into
account the cost function ft. Thus condition (15) becomes when applied to
the periods T and T + 1:













From (24) we obtain





= β(1 + rT+1)˜ uC(CT+1(0))






β(1 + rT+1)˜ uC(CT+1)






   

where we have used the following approximation of second order:
ET ˜ uC(CT+1(ǫ
B






       







∂C and ZT < 0 indicating the sensitivity of the household’s
utility regarding the volatility of its budget. The coeﬃcient ZT < 0 can be
expressed in terms of derivatives of Ct(ǫB
T+1) and Mt(ǫB
T+1) derived in (17)


















which we derived using equation (8) with (σV)2 and (σπ)2 denoting the
expected future uncertainty of output and inﬂation. Further, we assumed
12stochastic independence between inﬂation and income shocks and volatilities
σV and σπ constant in time to simplify notation.
Taking the log of equation (25) and using ci = logCi we receive the IS
















cT+1 − α(iT − ETπT+1 − ¯ rT) (27)
with the following deﬁnition:
k(cT+1) := K(CT+1 = e
cT+1) > 0 (28)
and iT = rT + ETπT+1 denoting the nominal interest rate and the natural
rate













Here we used a constant coeﬃcient ˜ k for the uncertainty term σ2
B.
On the demand side, we can summarize our ﬁndings based on equation (27)
as follows:
• Households’ utility is impacted adversely by income and inﬂation un-
certainty, because households who committed a part of their income for
consumption over several periods of time cannot adjust their consump-
tion plans optimally without facing additional costs when a budget
shock occurs and hence are forced to follow a sub-optimal consumption
plan for the periods of their commitment. Consequently, households
will always prefer a regime of low variability in inﬂation and income.
• The IS curve (27) shows an interesting feature: The expected impact of
possible period-T+1 shocks is anticipated by rational economic subjects
in period T and taken into account in their consumption plan in the
sense that future income is not fully taken into account in the current
period. Instead, future demand enters the formula for current demand





, reﬂecting the fact that households are
aware of the risk of loosing part of their future income due to frictions
13and hence are more careful regarding spending in period T. This can be
understood as an ”insurance eﬀect” in the behavior of households, i.e.
potential future friction losses due to uncertain inﬂation and income
levels imply households to spend less and save more in the current
period as an insurance against possible future losses.
• The natural interest rate is not constant but depends on output and
inﬂation volatility, reﬂecting friction losses for households due to uncer-
tain income and inﬂation levels. These friction losses are endogenously
determined, in particular they depend on the conduct of monetary pol-
icy as we show in the following.
• We have seen that the concept of re-allocation costs is more general
than assuming inﬂexible consumption, i.e. inﬂexibility can always be
expressed in terms of re-allocation costs in the budget of a household.
III Value maximization by ﬁrms
In the following we derive a model for ﬁrms facing rigidities in the hiring
process. To be precise, we argue that hiring decisions of ﬁrms are based on
an estimate of future demand for their goods, implying the risk that when
demand deviates from previous expectations, ﬁrms are over- oder under-
invested in labor, creating additional costs for them. This argument is not
only true for countries with direct rigidities due to labor laws which directly
limit the ability to hire or lay-oﬀ labor ﬂexibly in the short term, but also in
a ﬂexible job market as found in the United States if one takes into account
labor facilitating costs, i.e. necessary investments in oﬃce space, hardware
etc. which in most cases cannot be adjusted ﬂexibly in the short term in
response to sudden demand ﬂuctuations.
In our model, ﬁrms use a production technology for the good Yt(j) using
labor input Nt(j)
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (30)
with productivity At. As indicated in equations (1) and (2) in the intro-
duction it is important to mention that in the following we will distinguish
between gross output Yt according to the technology (30) and net output
after subtracting all frictions due to resource mis-allocation in the economy,
14which is disposable for households for consumption. In other words, only in
the steady state where no frictions occur we will have Ct = Yt. Otherwise, if
frictions appear due to expectation errors in the planning process of house-
holds and ﬁrms, consumption will be below output Ct < Yt due to frictions.
A Frictions in production
We consider the labor market to be ﬂexible from a wage-setting perspective,
but assume rigidities in the hiring process. To be precise, we assume that
in each period ﬁrms have to hire labor for the next period, based on the
forecasted demand for their goods in the next period, i.e. in period t ﬁrm
i forecasts a demand Yt+1|t(i) for its good in the following period and hires





In the period t + 1 the actual demand for its good Yt+1 can deviate from
the predicted level Yt+1|t(j) by a random variable ǫd
t+1(j) representing the
forecasting error regarding demand:
Yt+1(j) = Yt+1|t(j) + ǫ
d
t+1(j) (32)





As on the demand side, there are two ways to model rigidities in the ability
of ﬁrms to adjust their labor force to sudden ﬂuctuations in the demand for
their goods:
Inﬂexible labor:
Firms cannot adjust their labor force in the short term (i.e. in period t+1).
If demand turned out to be lower than expected (i.e. ǫd
t+1(j) < 0) this means












15compared with the situation where they could ﬂexibly adjust their labor
force. On the other hand, if demand exceeds expectations companies face












To sum up, the inﬂexibility to adjust labor in the short term increases eﬀec-














   
 Yt+1(j) − Yt+1|t(i)













Firms can adjust their work force in period t to the desired level (33) but
face additional costs for hiring in the short term in period t+1. This concept
is obviously more general in the sense that using (34) as a cost function will
produce the same result as assuming inﬂexibility in the short term hiring
process. However, analogous to the cost function (12) we have used for















where γ denotes the sensitivity of re-allocation cost regarding the forecasting
error. The case γ = 0 corresponds to the situation of an economy without
frictions.
B Supply of ﬁrms
The key step is to deﬁne the proﬁt maximizing behavior of ﬁrms, where we
will refer to the Calvo model of inﬂexible prices in the following, i.e. we
assume that in each period a ﬁxed percentage 1 − ω of randomly chosen
ﬁrms can adjust their prices, the remaining ﬁrms are bound to the prices of
the previous period. When ﬁrms are able to adjust prices, they maximize
16the present value of future proﬁts, where a future period i is discounted
with ∆i,t+i and weighted with the probability ωi of not being able to adjust
the price set today within the next i periods. We use the demand for the













where we have assumed that the individual demand shocks are generated by
one global shock in demand, i.e. ǫd
t+i(j) ≡ ǫd
t+i∀j to simplify notation. The







































As mentioned in the introduction, we perform two steps to derive our model
equations – at ﬁrst we take the expectation over the endogenous variables
causing friction losses, then we perform a log-linearization of the model.
Taking the expectation regarding ǫd






















where we have assumed ǫd
t+i to be N(0,σ2







Deriving the present value of future proﬁts with regards to the price Pt(j)
to determine the optimal price P ∗
t chosen by all ﬁrms adjusting prices in the
1The approximation is exact in the equilibrium Yt(j) ≡ Y , which is the basis for the
derivation of the log-linearized model below.






























































































































































t =  ϕ
0






showing that the markup   over real labor costs increases in frictions caused
due to unpredictability of demand represented by the factor (1 + γσ2
d), i.e.
companies are passing on the costs of frictions caused by unforeseen demand
ﬂuctuations to clients. Further, noting that   is the markup over real labor
















The second step is to derive a log-linearized model, i.e. we will approximate
all future endogenous variables around the steady-state, treating them as

















Expanding (43) around the steady-state Qt = P ∗
t /Pt = 1 up to second order






ω(Θ − 2(1 − ω))
2(1 − ω)2 π
2
t (44)
Moreover, to derive a log-linear inﬂation adjustment curve we expand out-
put Yt, the price level Pt and the marginal costs ϕt+i around the steady-state
characterized by Qt =  ϕ = 1, where we include second order terms for price
level and inﬂation neglected in the original derivation cited above. Conse-











i[(1 − α)Etˆ yt+i



















i[Etˆ ϕt+i + Etˆ pt+i − ˆ pt]





i[Etˆ ϕt+i + Etˆ pt+i]
=⇒ ˆ qt − ˆ  t + ˆ pt = (1 − ωβ)(ˆ ϕt + ˆ pt) + ωβ(Etˆ qt+1 + Etˆ pt+1)
=⇒ ˆ qt − ˆ  t = (1 − ωβ)ˆ ϕt + ωβ(Etˆ qt+1 + Etˆ pt+1 − ˆ pt)
= (1 − ωβ)ˆ ϕt + ωβ(Etˆ qt+1 + Etπt+1)
Using (44) to substitute ˆ q yields:
ω
1 − ω









ω(Θ − 2(1 − ω))




t) + ˆ  t
19Hence we obtain
πt = βEtπt+1 + κˆ ϕt +







t) + ut (45)
with κ :=
(1−ω)(1−ωβ)
ω and where we used Etπ2
t+1 = σ2
π +(Etπt+1)2 assuming a
constant volatility σ2
π. The shock term ut = 1−ω
ω ˆ  t represents inﬂation shocks
due to a change in the markup of companies and hence a change of the degree
of monopolistic competition. Equation (45) represents a quadratic equation
in πt and πt+1. Since we are only interested in the link between present inﬂa-
tion πt and expectations regarding future inﬂation Etπt+1 and its uncertainty
σ2
π, we drop the quadratic inﬂation terms – the qualitative behavior of the
system is unchanged by this simpliﬁcation.
Further, since the labor market is assumingly ﬂexible from a wage-setting
point of view, we can express the term κˆ ϕt in terms of percentage changes
of output around the steady-state, as we show in the following in two steps:
Deﬁnition of steady-state:
The steady-state is the equilibrium state where all goods are produced and
consumed in equal quantities and no friction losses occur and hence house-
hold income equals output and consumption equals household income, i.e.
Ct = Vt = Yt = Yt|t−1 (46)
Ct(j) ≡ Ct, Yt(j) ≡ Yt (47)
However, outside of the steady-state we can write the households’ gross in-
come consisting of wages earned and corporate proﬁts Πt received as output





Nt + Πt =
Wt
Pt








Equation (48) basically states that households’ gross income equals output
minus productivity losses due to resource misplanning. For small perturba-
tions around the steady state we conclude from equation (48) that in ﬁrst
20order approximation we have with variables with a hat denoting percentage
changes around the steady-state:
ˆ ct = ˆ yt (49)
Real marginal costs:
As a next step, we calculate percentage changes of real costs for two situa-
tions:




t = ηˆ n
f
t + αˆ c
f
t (50)
Using (49) and ˆ y
f
t = ˆ nt+ˆ a
f
t derived from (30) we obtain the percentage









• The situation of non-ﬂexible prices in the sense of Calvo: From equation
(35) we conclude the following relationship for percentage changes:
ˆ ϕt = ˆ wt − ˆ pt − ˆ at (52)
Using the corresponding relationship derived from labor supply (42)
(where again we use relation (49))
ˆ wt − ˆ pt = ηˆ nt + αˆ yt (53)
and the relationship ˆ yt = ˆ nt + ˆ at following equation (30) we obtain
ˆ ϕt = η(ˆ yt − ˆ at) + αˆ yt − ˆ at
= (α + η)ˆ yt − (1 + η)ˆ at




with the output gap xt = ˆ yt − ˆ y
f
t and ϕ = (α + η).
Thus, we obtain the IA curve including uncertainty regarding inﬂation:
πt = βEtπt+1 + ϕxt + ζσ
2
π + ut (54)
21with
ζ =
Θ − 2(1 − ω)
2(1 − ω)
ωβ (55)
As regards the order of magnitude of ζ, matching the IA curve to empirical
data (for details cf Woodford, 2003) yields ϕ ≈ 0.024, which means that ω is
close to one and hence the coeﬃcient ζ of uncertainty regarding future inﬂa-
tion can be deemed positive. Consequently, present inﬂation πt is increased
by both higher expected future inﬂation Etπt+1 and uncertainty about future
inﬂation, i.e. ﬁrms setting prices today tend to increase prices more if they
are not certain about their inﬂation forecast. The reason can be understood
by equation (44) – the optimal price chosen is a convex function of inﬂation.
Consequently, when inﬂation is a stochastic variable, the expected optimal
price will be greater than the price formula (44) evaluated at the expected
inﬂation rate:
Eˆ q(πt) > ˆ q(Eπt)
Hence, we conclude that proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms tend to ”over-price” their
products when the future price level is uncertain.
We can draw the following conclusions for the supply side of the economy:
• Rigidities in the capability of adjusting labor input in the very short
term increases average labor costs. This eﬀect is passed on to consumers
by increasing the markups accordingly.
• Firms facing uncertain future inﬂation tend to ”over-price” their prod-
ucts due to the concavity of the underlying proﬁt function represented
by a second order inﬂation moment in the inﬂation adjustment curve
and creating an additional inﬂation bias.
• Due to demand uncertainty, the real wage is perceived asymmetrically
by households and ﬁrms, i.e. households’ labor supply according to
equation (16) is based on the real wage Wt/Pt, whereas companies see
eﬀective labor costs according to equation (41) which are higher by
a factor of (1 + γσ2
d). This means that labor input by ﬁrms will be
ineﬃciently low.
22IV Monetary policy in a log-linearized model
A Log-linear model with frictions
We analyze a log-linearized system for percentage changes of output around
the steady state based on the IS curve (27) and the IA curve (54) after
performing two simpliﬁcations, i.e. from equation (48) we derive two ap-
proximations around the steady-state deﬁned in (46) and (47):
• Equation (49) which we use to reformulate the IS curve (27) in terms
of deviations xt of output around the steady state.
• σ2
V = σ2
x which we use in the natural interest rate (29) and σ2
d = σ2
x
which we use to approximate demand volatility in (38).
Hence, the log-linear system reads:
IS curve xt = Etxt+1 − α(it − Etπt+1 − ¯ rt) (56)
IA curve πt = βEtπt+1 + ϕxt + ζσ
2
π + ut (57)





A key component for the analysis of monetary policy is the derivation of
a global utility loss function, which is used to assess and compare the appro-
priateness of diﬀerent monetary policy regimes from a welfare point of view.
Woodford (2003) derives the following loss function through a second order
approximation of households’ utility around the steady state:
Lt := π
2
t + λ(xt − x
∗)
2 (58)
Here x∗ = ye
t − y
f




t . For the sake of brevity, we refer to Woodford (2003)
and only outline the changes in the original derivation of equation (58). In
essence, it is straightforward to verify that the derivation of the term π2
t
representing the second order approximation of utility from consumption
around its steady state and the term (xt − x∗)2 representing the second
order approximation of dis-utility from labor around the steady state remain
unchanged, except for the term x∗, as we derive in the following. Therefore,
23we use equation (30) in condition (42) and obtain for the steady state in




































The natural output y
f
t is the log of Yt given in equation (59), whereas the
eﬃcient output is given by the log of equation (59) by setting   = 1 to reﬂect
a market under full competition and without any friction losses. Hence we

















logΘ + log(Θ − 1)
η + α


























1 > 0 shows that higher output uncertainty widens the gap between
eﬃcient and natural output level. Thus, we can conclude that we obtain an
extended loss function of the form
Lt := π
2








Hence, compared with the standard loss function (58) with constant x∗, equa-
tion (63) additionally takes into account friction losses caused by ﬁrms that
are invested ineﬃciently – the more the higher the value of σx.
B Monetary policy with frictions
In the following, we analyze the impact of endogenous frictions on
• The inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ, in particular the sacriﬁce ratio;
24• The reaction function of monetary policy to demand and supply shocks
and
• The role of the well-known inﬂation bias in monetary policy research.
It is interesting to analyze the steady-state behavior of the IA curve (57), i.e.











Regarding the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ, the impact of endogenous uncer-
tainty is already revealed by the long-term Phillips curve (64), which has the
same slope
ϕ
1−β as in the standard model but which is shifted upwards by the
additional inﬂation bias proportional to σ2
π. Thus, the sacriﬁce ratio which
is typically deﬁned as the slope of the curve (64) denoting the cost of an
inﬂation reduction of one percent in terms of output is unaltered. However,
the trade-oﬀ is worsened by an additional inﬂation bias, which can only be
removed by additional output costs as indicated in (64). To conclude, the
model equation (64) gives a reasoning for accepting a certain base inﬂation
rate, which is the case for most central banks, in particular the Fed and the
European Central Bank.
To analyze the impact of endogenous frictions on the conduct of monetary
policy, we assess the behavior of the monetary authority by minimizing the
loss function (63) with the IA curve (57) as a period constraint.
It is important to mention that in the model we presented inﬂation shocks ut
occurring in the IA curve (54) with standard deviation σu can impact both
inﬂation and output, depending on the conduct of monetary policy, and re-
sults in volatile inﬂation rates with standard deviation σπ and volatile output
with standard deviation σx. To be precise, the monetary authority faces the
problem to distribute shocks ut between output xt and inﬂation πt and hence
distributing the uncertainty σu between σπ and σx and consequently man-
aging the trade-oﬀ between friction losses caused by output variability and
inﬂation variability.
Consequently, a straightforward way of prescribing a rule-based policy is
to explicitly deﬁne the share ν of the shock ut that has to be absorbed by
25output, as proposed in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999):






Here output is simply counteracting inﬂation shocks with the factor ν > 0. In
practice, the output-rule (65) can be implemented through a nominal interest
rate rule by plugging (65) into the IS curve (56):
it = π




where we assumed output and inﬂation expectations close to the equilibrium
level, i.e. Etxt+1 ≈ 0 and the steady-state inﬂation level πe derived below.
Plugging (65) into the IA curve (54) yields
πt = ϕxt + βEtπt+1 + ζσ
2
π + ut = βtπt+1 + ζσ
2
π + (1 − ϕν)ut (67)
=⇒ σ
2




The factor ν determines the distribution of the volatility σu between σx and
σπ and the resulting friction losses due to output uncertainty and inﬂation
uncertainty. Hence, the natural rate ¯ rt entering the policy function (66)
reads:
















which shows that the natural rate and hence the interest rate rule of monetary
policy depend on the choice of the trade-oﬀ parameter ν. This reﬂects the
fact that the natural rate is no longer constant but is inﬂuenced by frictions
caused by inﬂation uncertainty and output uncertainty. Monetary policy can
actively manage the trade-oﬀ between these two types of frictions as reﬂected
by the rule parameter ν in the natural rate (69). Consequently, higher order
terms are not exogenously constant as observed in the analysis of Uribe and
Schmitt-Grohe (2003), but are determined by the choice of monetary policy
represented by the parameter ν.
Inﬂation expectations can be found by iterating equation (67) forward in
26time (where we assume the shocks ut not to be auto-correlated and thus
Eut+i = 0 to simplify notation):
π


























































































































Hence, the loss function with uncertainty shows additional terms proportional
in terms of x∗
1 and ζ compared with the loss function without the incorpora-
tion of friction losses. In the following we distinguish between three diﬀerent
monetary policy rules based on the rule (65) and its implementation (66).
Output rule:
The output rule xt ≡ 0 implies a factor ν = 0 in the rule (65) and hence
implies the minimal output variability σx = 0 but the maximal inﬂation
variability σ2
π = σ2












(1 − β)3 (72)
27The last term proportional to ζ2 indicates the additional friction loss due to
inﬂation variability.
Inﬂation rule:
The other extreme of the rule (65) is total price stabilization πt ≡ 0 imply-
ing a value of ν = 1/ϕ. In this case inﬂation variability is minimal σπ = 0
according to equation (68) but output ﬂuctuates with a volatility of σ2
u/ϕ2.












where the term proportional to x∗
1 shows the adverse impact of friction losses
in the productivity of ﬁrms on welfare.
Optimal rule:
The optimal policy in the context of the rule (65) and its implementation (66)
is apparently a value of ν between the output rule and inﬂation rule to opti-
mally manage the trade-oﬀ between friction losses due to output variability
and inﬂation variability. The loss-minimizing value of ν reads:
νopt =
ϕ




(λ + ϕ2)2 −
2(ϕ2(2ϕ2 + λ) − x∗
0x∗
1λ(10ϕ2 − 2λ) − λ2)ϕσ2
u
(λ + ϕ2)3(1 − β)2 ζ
2
with the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side representing the solution in absence













(λ + ϕ2)2(1 − β)
+
λ4σ4
u(ϕ2 + λ + 8ϕ2x0x1)
(λ + ϕ2)5(1 − β)3
The conduct of monetary policy is inﬂuenced by inﬂation uncertainty and
output uncertainty in opposite ways: The optimal value of ν increases in
x∗
1, i.e. the sensitivity of the economy regarding output uncertainty and re-
lated friction losses, hence making output stabilization more attractive. At
the same time, ν decreases with ζ, i.e. the sensitivity regarding inﬂation
uncertainty and related frictions, making inﬂation stabilization increasingly
attractive. Since the eﬀect of inﬂation uncertainty is quadratic in the inﬂa-
tion sensitivity coeﬃcient ζ but linear in the output sensitivity coeﬃcient
x∗
1, at least for low levels of sensitivity we can expect output stabilization to
28become more important.
V Conclusion
We have constructed a model with rigidities in the ability of households and
ﬁrms to ﬂexibly re-optimize their resource allocation after the appearance
of shocks. These rigidities reﬂect the fact that households and ﬁrms enter
into commitments regarding the allocation of resources limiting their ability
to ﬂexibly respond to unforeseen shocks. Mathematically speaking, these
frictions can either be formulated as a strict inﬂexibility of certain endoge-
nous variables for a certain period of time or as penalty costs that economic
subjects face when they want to change pre-committed resource plans. The
latter concept proved to be more general and formed the basis for our micro-
foundation of an IS curve representing demand and an inﬂation adjustment
curve describing ﬁrms and the assessment of monetary policy.
The model equations we have derived contain frictions on the demand side
and supply side represented by higher order moments in endogenous vari-
ables. These statistical moments are not exogenously constant but model-
determined and have to be taken into account when assessing the conduct of
monetary policy.
The model we presented taking into account the afore-mentioned rigidities in
the micro-foundation shows several results not contained in the linear model
equations of a New Keynesian model framework: First of all, the natural
interest rate and natural output which are typically key components of the
policy framework of monetary authorities depend on output and inﬂation
uncertainty and hence are endogenously determined within the economic
system. In particular, the way monetary authorities manage the trade-oﬀ
between output and inﬂation stabilization and hence the trade-oﬀ between
frictions due to output and inﬂation variability determines the natural inter-
est rate and natural output.
29Moreover, we have shown that uncertainty regarding inﬂation and output
reduces the productivity of ﬁrms, because they will be invested ineﬃciently
in resources. As a consequence, the natural output level is a decreasing func-
tion of uncertainty and hence endogenously determined.
Furthermore, uncertainty can explain a positive inﬂation bias even where
x∗ = 0 (eﬃcient natural output), which prevails under both discretionary
and rule-based policies. This inﬂation bias exists in addition to the inﬂation
bias occurring in the standard model of the new neoclassical synthesis due
to the well-known time-inconsistency problem, which can be avoided by a
rule-based policy. The reason for this additional inﬂation bias is the fact
that proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms, being aware of uncertain future prices, tend
to ”over-price” their products compared to the standard Calvo model. This
”over-pricing” is an endogenous inﬂuence determined within the system by
inﬂation uncertainty. Consequently, the model we presented can explain pos-
itive inﬂation rates even in situations where output is at its natural level and
monetary policy is rule-based, which is in accordance with empirical observa-
tions, since most modern economies show a positive inﬂation rate throughout
the business cycle (cf Walsh, 2003). Henceforth, our model gives a reasoning
for accepting a certain positive base inﬂation, as most central banks currently
do, whereas the sacriﬁce ratio deﬁned as the cost of an inﬂation decrease in
terms of output is unaltered in our model.
As regards the conduct of monetary policy, we have shown that the behavior
of the monetary authority is modiﬁed by endogenous uncertainty by more
than constant terms only, as it is the case when one assumes exogenous un-
certainty. Consequently, the statement proved by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2003) that higher order approximations lead to essentially the same model
up to constant terms no longer holds. Instead, higher statistical moments
play an important role in the economic system and the conduct of monetary
policy, since they are no longer constant but determined by the system itself.
The monetary authority faces a new trade-oﬀ in minimizing the frictions
due to inﬂation uncertainty and output uncertainty and can determine the
economic subjects’ expectations regarding higher statistical moments of the
distribution of endogenous variables, which enter the model function for sup-
30ply since ﬁrms are typically described by risk-averse utility or proﬁt functions.
A future focus of research comprises how monetary authorities can take into
account its indirect inﬂuence on productivity and inﬂation as indicated by
endogenous higher statistical moments in the model equations we presented.
This includes the question of transparency, i.e. explaining the inﬂuence of
higher moments to the public including the corresponding reaction of mon-
etary policy, e.g. for the non-linear inﬂation bias we have observed in our
model.
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